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Abstract We improve the flexibility in designing access structures of quantum stabilizer-based secret
sharing schemes for classical secrets, by introducing message randomization in their encoding proce-
dures. We generalize the Gilbert-Varshamov bound for deterministic encoding to randomized encoding
of classical secrets. We also provide an explicit example of a ramp secret sharing scheme with which
multiple symbols in its classical secret are revealed to an intermediate set, and justify the necessity of
incorporating strong security criterion of conventional secret sharing. Finally, we propose an explicit
construction of strongly secure ramp secret sharing scheme by quantum stabilizers, which can support
twice as large classical secrets as the McEliece-Sarwate strongly secure ramp secret sharing scheme of
the same share size and the access structure.
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1 Introduction
Secret sharing is a scheme to share a secret among multiple participants so that only qualified sets of
participants can reconstruct the secret, while forbidden sets have no information about the secret [42,
46]. A piece of information received by a participant is called a share. A set of participants that is neither
qualified nor forbidden is said to be intermediate. If there is no intermediate set, a secret sharing scheme
is said to be perfect, otherwise said to be ramp [4,47]. There is an upper bound on the size of secret for
fixed size of shares, when secret sharing is perfect. On the other hand, the size of secret can be arbitrarily
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Randomized quantum secret sharing 2
large for fixed size of shares in ramp schemes. In this paper we consider ramp schemes, in other words,
we allow intermediate sets of participants or shares.
Both secret and shares are traditionally classical information. There exists a close connection between
secret sharing and classical error-correcting codes [3,11,13,14,26,30,37].
After the importance of quantum information became well-recognized, secret sharing schemes with
quantum shares were proposed [12,17,20,22,44]. A connection between quantum secret sharing and
quantum error-correcting codes has been well-known for many years [12,17,28,29,41,44]. Well-known
classes of quantum error-correcting codes are the CSS codes [10,45], the stabilizer codes [8,9,16] and
their nonbinary generalizations [2,23,35].
The access structure of a secret sharing scheme is the set of qualified sets, that of intermediate sets
and that of forbidden sets. When both secret and shares are classical information, encoding of secrets to
shares are almost always randomized, that is, for a fixed secret, shares are randomly chosen from a set
determined by the secret [42,46]. By message randomization we mean this kind of randomized encoding
of secrets to shares. It was shown that some randomness in encoders is indispensable with classical shares
[5,6,7].
In contrast with classical shares, Gottesman [17, Theorem 3] proved that message randomization does
not offer any advantage when both secret and shares are quantum information, and that use of unitary
encoding of quantum secret to quantum shares is sufficient. Probably because of Gottesman’s observation,
secret sharing schemes based on quantum error-correcting codes have not used message randomization,
as far as this author knows.
In our previous research [31,32], we expressed secret sharing for classical secrets based on quan-
tum stabilizer codes by linear codes, and expressed qualified and forbidden sets in terms of the linear
codes associated with quantum stabilizers. By using that, we gave a Gilbert-Varshamov-type existence
condition of secret sharing schemes with given parameters, and proved that there exist infinitely many
access structures that can be realized by quantum stabilizer codes but cannot be realized by any classical
information processing.
However, there are some drawbacks in our proposal [31,32]. For example, any 𝑛−1 participants out
of 𝑛 participants can be made forbidden, for example, by Shamir’s scheme. But such an access structure
cannot be realized by [31,32]. The first goal of this paper is to make the stabilizer-based secret sharing
more flexible in designing access structures by introducing message randomization in the encoding. In
our previous proposal [31,32], shares are deterministic functions of secrets. The proposed scheme in this
paper includes [31,32] as a special case.
Ordinary ramp schemes have the following security risk: Suppose that classical secret is 𝐦 = (𝑚1,. . . , 𝑚𝑘), and an intermediate set has 𝓁(≥ 1) symbol of information about 𝐦. Then that intermediateset sometimes knows 𝑚𝑖 explicitly for some 𝑖. This insecurity was mentioned in [37,47]. Iwamoto andYamamoto [21] explicitly constructed such an example with classical secret and classical shares, and
Zhang and Matsumoto [48] did with quantum shares. In order to address this security risk, Yamamoto
[47] introduced the notion of strong security into ramp schemes: A secret sharing scheme with classical
secret 𝐦 = (𝑚1, . . . , 𝑚𝑘) is said to be strongly secure if any (𝑘 − 𝓁) symbols in 𝐦 is always statisticallyindependent of shares in an intermediate set that has 𝓁 symbol of information about 𝐦, for 𝓁 = 1, . . . ,
𝑘 − 1. The second goal of this paper is to give an explicit construction of strongly secure ramp secret
sharing for classical secrets based on quantum stabilizer codes, by extending the previous construction
[31,32].
Strong security concerns with secrecy of parts of a message. The secrecy of parts of a message has
also been studied for network coding [18,25,34,43] and wiretap channel coding [19,24].
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This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces necessary notations and proposes random-
ized encoding for quantum stabilizer-based secret sharing. Section 3 clarifies the access structure of the
proposed scheme. Section 4 analyses the amount of information leaked to an intermediate set, which will
be used for the strong security later. Section 5 generalize the Gilbert-Varshamov existential condition for
secret sharing schemes from one given in [31,32]. Section 6 introduces a strong security criterion and an
explicit construction with strong security based on Reed-Solomon codes. Then we compare the proposed
construction with the McEliece-Sarwate strongly secure ramp secret sharing scheme [37].
2 Randomized encoding and its access structures
2.1 Preliminaries
Let 𝐴 ⊂ {1, . . . , 𝑛} be a set of shares (or equivalently participants), 𝐴 = {1, . . . , 𝑛} ⧵ 𝐴, and Tr𝐴
the partial trace over 𝐴. For a density matrix 𝜌, col(𝜌) denotes its column space. When col(𝜌1), . . . ,
col(𝜌𝑛) are orthogonal to each other, that is, 𝜌𝑖𝜌𝑗 = 0 for 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗, we can distinguish 𝜌1, . . . , 𝜌𝑛 by asuitable projective measurement with probability 1. Since density matrices are quantum generalization
of probability distributions [38], the result of randomized encoding of a secret can be expressed as a
density matrix.
Definition 1 [31,32] Let 𝜌𝐴(𝐦) be the density matrix of shares in 𝐴 encoded from a classical secret𝐦.We say𝐴 to be qualified if col(𝜌𝐴(𝐦))) and col(𝜌𝐴(𝐦′)) are orthogonal to each other for different classicalsecrets𝐦,𝐦′. We say 𝐴 to be forbidden if 𝜌𝐴(𝐦) is the same density matrix regardless of classical secret
𝐦. By an access structure we mean the set of qualified sets and the set of forbidden sets.
Let 𝑝 be a prime number, 𝐅𝑝 the finite field with 𝑝 elements, and𝐂𝑝 the 𝑝-dimensional complex linearspace. The quantum state space of 𝑛 qudits is denoted by 𝐂⊗𝑛𝑝 with its orthonormal basis {|𝐯⟩ ∶ 𝐯 ∈ 𝐅𝑛𝑝}.For two vectors 𝐚, 𝐛 ∈ 𝐅𝑛𝑝, denote by ⟨𝐚, 𝐛⟩𝐸 the standard Euclidean inner product. For two vectors
(𝐚|𝐛) and (𝐚′|𝐛′) ∈ 𝐅2𝑛𝑝 , we define the standard symplectic inner product
⟨(𝐚|𝐛), (𝐚′|𝐛′)⟩𝑠 = ⟨𝐚,𝐛′⟩𝐸 − ⟨𝐚′,𝐛⟩𝐸 .
For an 𝐅𝑝-linear space 𝐶S ⊂ 𝐅2𝑛𝑝 , 𝐶⟂𝑠S denotes its orthogonal space in 𝐅2𝑛𝑝 with respect to ⟨⋅, ⋅⟩𝑠.
Throughout this paper we always assume dim𝐶S = 𝑛− 𝑘− 𝑠 and 𝐶S ⊆ 𝐶⟂𝑠S . We will use 𝑘 to denote thenumber of symbols in classical secrets and 𝑠(≥ 0) to denote amount of randomness in encoding. We also
assume that we have 𝐶⟂𝑠R ⊇ 𝐶R ⊃ 𝐶S and dim𝐶R = 𝑛 − 𝑠.For (𝐚|𝐛) ∈ 𝐅2𝑛𝑝 , define the 𝑝𝑛×𝑝𝑛 complex unitarymatrix𝑋(𝐚)𝑍(𝐛) as defined in [23]. An [[𝑛, 𝑘+𝑠]]𝑝quantum stabilizer codes 𝑄 encoding 𝑘 qudits into 𝑛 qudits can be defined as a simultaneous eigenspace
of all 𝑋(𝐚)𝑍(𝐛) ((𝐚|𝐛) ∈ 𝐶S). Unlike [23] we do not require the eigenvalue of 𝑄 to be one.
2.2 Proposed randomized encoding
It is well-known in mathematics [1, Chapter 7] that there always exists 𝐶S ⊆ 𝐶R ⊆ 𝐶max ⊆ 𝐶⟂𝑠R ⊆ 𝐶⟂𝑠Ssuch that 𝐶max = 𝐶⟂𝑠max. Note that 𝐶max is not unique and usually there are many possible choices of
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𝐶max. We have dim𝐶max = 𝑛 and have an isomorphism 𝑓 ∶ 𝐅𝑘𝑝 → 𝐶⟂𝑠S ∕𝐶⟂𝑠R as linear spaces without
inner products. Since 𝐶max = 𝐶⟂𝑠max, 𝐶max defines an [[𝑛, 0]]𝑝 quantum stabilizer code 𝑄0. Without lossof generality we may assume 𝑄0 ⊂ 𝑄. Let |𝜑⟩ ∈ 𝑄0 be a quantum state vector. Since 𝐶max = 𝐶⟂𝑠max, fora coset 𝑉 ∈ 𝐶⟂𝑠S ∕𝐶max and (𝐚|𝐛), (𝐚′|𝐛′) ∈ 𝑉 , 𝑋(𝐚)𝑍(𝐛)|𝜑⟩ and 𝑋(𝐚′)𝑍(𝐛′)|𝜑⟩ differ by a constantmultiple in 𝐂 and physically express the same quantum state in 𝑄. By an abuse of notation, for a coset
𝑉 ∈ 𝐶⟂𝑠S ∕𝐶max we will write |𝑉 𝜑⟩ to mean 𝑋(𝐚)𝑍(𝐛)|𝜑⟩ ((𝐚|𝐛) ∈ 𝑉 ).For a given classical secret𝐦 ∈ 𝐅𝑘𝑝 , we consider the following secret sharing scheme with 𝑛 partici-pants:
1. 𝑓 (𝐦) is a coset of 𝐶⟂𝑠S ∕𝐶⟂𝑠R and 𝑓 (𝐦) can also seen as a subset of 𝐶⟂𝑠S ∕𝐶max. Choose 𝑉 ∈ 𝑓 (𝐦) ⊂
𝐶⟂𝑠S ∕𝐶max at uniformly random. Prepare the quantum codeword |𝑉 𝜑⟩ ∈ 𝑄 that corresponds to theclassical secret 𝐦.
2. Distribute each qudit in the quantum codeword |𝑉 𝜑⟩ to a participant.
Since there are 𝑝𝑠 choices of 𝑉 above, the density matrix of 𝑛 shares is
𝜌(𝐦) = 1
𝑝𝑠
∑
𝑉 ∈𝑓 (𝐦)
|𝑉 𝜑⟩⟨𝑉 𝜑|.
Remark 2 The encoding procedure in [31,32] corresponds to the special case 𝐶R = 𝐶max = 𝐶⟂𝑠R and
𝑠 = 0 in the above proposed scheme.
Example 3 Let 𝑝 = 3, 𝑛 = 4, 𝑘 = 𝑠 = 2. A basis of the doubly-extended [4, 2, 3]3 Reed-Solomon codeover 𝐅3 consists of
𝐯1 = (1, 1, 1, 0),
𝐯2 = (0, 1, 2, 1).
By using them, we define 𝐶S = {𝟎}, 𝐶R as the linear space spanned by {(𝐯1|𝟎), (𝟎|𝐯1)}, and 𝐶max as thelinear space spanned by {(𝐯1|𝟎), (𝐯2|𝟎), (𝟎|𝐯1), (𝟎|𝐯2)}. Let
𝐯3 = (0, 1, 1, 0).
Then 𝐶⟂𝑠R is spanned by 𝐶max ∪ {(𝐯3|𝟎), (𝟎|𝐯3)}. Let
𝐯4 = (0, 0, 0, 1).
𝐶⟂𝑠S = 𝐅
8
3 and we can use {(𝐯4|𝟎) + 𝐶⟂𝑠R , (𝟎|𝐯4) + 𝐶⟂𝑠R } as a basis of 𝐶⟂𝑠S ∕𝐶⟂𝑠R .
For a given secret (𝑚1, 𝑚2) ∈ 𝐅23, the proposed encoder chooses a vector at uniformly random fromthe set
(0, 0, 0, 𝑚1|0, 0, 0, 𝑚2) + 𝐶⟂𝑠R ⊂ 𝐅83.
Since |𝐶⟂𝑠R | = 36, for fixed (𝑚1, 𝑚2) the number of possible choices is 36. But since |𝜑⟩ is an eigenvector ofall unitary matrices corresponding to a vector in 𝐶max, for fixed (𝑚1, 𝑚2) the number of possible quantumstates is |𝐶⟂𝑠R ∕𝐶max| = 32. The encoded shares 𝑋(𝐚)𝑍(𝐛)|𝜑⟩ consist of 4 qudit in 𝐂3. Each quantumshare in 𝐂3 is distributed to each participant.
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3 Necessary and sufficient conditions on qualified and forbidden sets
Let 𝐴 ⊂ {1, . . . , 𝑛}. Define 𝐅𝐴𝑝 = {(𝑎1, . . . , 𝑎𝑛|𝑏1, . . . , 𝑏𝑛) ∈ 𝐅2𝑛𝑝 ∶ (𝑎𝑖, 𝑏𝑖) = 0 for 𝑖 ∉ 𝐴}. Let 𝑃𝐴 to bethe projection map onto 𝐴, that is, 𝑃𝐴(𝑎1, . . . , 𝑎𝑛|𝑏1, . . . , 𝑏𝑛) = (𝑎𝑖|𝑏𝑖)𝑖∈𝐴.
Theorem 4 For the secret sharing scheme described in Section 2, 𝐴 is qualified if and only if
dim𝐶R∕𝐶S = dim𝐶R ∩ 𝐅𝐴𝑝 ∕𝐶S ∩ 𝐅
𝐴
𝑝 . (1)
𝐴 is forbidden if and only if
0 = dim𝐶R ∩ 𝐅𝐴𝑝 ∕𝐶S ∩ 𝐅
𝐴
𝑝 . (2)
Remark 5 The encoding procedure depends on the choice of 𝐶max = 𝐶⟂𝑠max but by Theorem 4 we see thatthe access structure is independent of that choice.
Proof (Theorem 4) Assume Eq. (1). Then there exists a basis {(𝐚1|𝐛1)+𝐶S, . . . , (𝐚𝑘|𝐛𝑘)+𝐶S} of 𝐶R∕𝐶Ssuch that (𝐚𝑖|𝐛𝑖) ∈ 𝐅𝐴𝑝 . Any two vectors in a coset 𝑉 ∈ 𝐶⟂𝑠S ∕𝐶⟂𝑠R have the same value of the symplec-tic inner product against a fixed (𝐚𝑖|𝐛𝑖), which will be denoted by ⟨(𝐚𝑖|𝐛𝑖), 𝑉 ⟩𝑠. Suppose that we havetwo different cosets 𝑉1, 𝑉2 ∈ 𝐶⟂𝑠S ∕𝐶⟂𝑠R , and that ⟨(𝐚𝑖|𝐛𝑖), 𝑉1⟩𝑠 = ⟨(𝐚𝑖|𝐛𝑖), 𝑉2⟩𝑠 for all 𝑖. It means that
𝑉1 − 𝑉2 = 𝐶⟂𝑠R is zero in 𝐶⟂𝑠S ∕𝐶⟂𝑠R , a contradiction. We have seen that any two different cosets have dif-ferent symplectic inner product values against some (𝐚𝑖|𝐛𝑖). For each 𝑖, the 𝑛 participants can collectivelyperform quantum projective measurement corresponding to the eigenspaces of 𝑋(𝐚𝑖)𝑍(𝐛𝑖) and can de-termine the symplectic inner product1 ⟨(𝐚𝑖|𝐛𝑖), 𝑓 (𝐦)⟩𝑠 as [23, Lemma 5] when the classical secret is 𝐦.Since (𝐚𝑖|𝐛𝑖) has nonzero components only at 𝐴, the above measurement can be done only by 𝐴, whichmeans 𝐴 can reconstruct 𝐦.
Assume that Eq. (1) is false. Since the orthogonal space of 𝐶S in 𝐅𝐴𝑝 is isomorphic to 𝑃𝐴(𝐶⟂𝑠S ), whichcan be seen as the almost same argument as the duality between shortened linear codes and punctured
linear codes [40], we see that dim𝑃𝐴(𝐶⟂𝑠S )∕𝑃𝐴(𝐶⟂𝑠R ) < dim𝐶⟂𝑠S ∕𝐶⟂𝑠R . This means that there exists twodifferent classical secrets 𝐦1 and 𝐦2 such that 𝑃𝐴(𝑓 (𝐦1)) = 𝑃𝐴(𝑓 (𝐦2)). This means that the encodingprocedures of𝐦1 and𝐦2 are the exactly the same on𝐴 and produce the same density matrix on𝐴, whichshows that 𝐴 is not qualified.
Assume Eq. (2). Then we have dim𝑃𝐴(𝐶⟂𝑠S )∕𝑃𝐴(𝐶⟂𝑠R ) = 0. This means that for all classical secrets
𝐦, 𝑃𝐴(𝑓 (𝐦)) and their encoding procedures on 𝐴 are the same, which produces the same density matrixon 𝐴 regardless of 𝐦. This shows that 𝐴 is forbidden.
Assume that Eq. (2) is false. Then there exist two different classical secrets 𝐦1, 𝐦2, and (𝐚|𝐛) ∈
𝐶R ∩ 𝐅𝐴𝑝 ⧵ 𝐶S ∩ 𝐅
𝐴
𝑝 such that ⟨(𝐚|𝐛), 𝑓 (𝐦1)⟩𝑠 ≠ ⟨(𝐚|𝐛), 𝑓 (𝐦2)⟩𝑠.
By [23, Lemma 5], this means that the quantummeasurement corresponding to𝑋(𝐚)𝑍(𝐛) gives different
outcomes with Tr𝐴(𝜌(𝐦1)) and Tr𝐴(𝜌(𝐦2)). Since (𝐚|𝐛) ∈ 𝐅𝐴𝑝 , measurement of 𝑋(𝐚)𝑍(𝐛) can be per-formed only by participants in 𝐴. These observations show that 𝐴 is not forbidden. ⊓⊔
1 If we assume a non-prime finite field 𝐅𝑞 as our base field, then the quantum measurement outcome just determines [23,Lemma 5] Tr𝑞∕𝑝(⟨(𝐚𝑖|𝐛𝑖), 𝑓 (𝐦)⟩𝑠) in place of ⟨(𝐚𝑖|𝐛𝑖), 𝑓 (𝐦)⟩𝑠, where Tr𝑞∕𝑝 is the trace map from 𝐅𝑞 to its prime subfield
𝐅𝑝. Assuming a non-prime field 𝐅𝑞 significantly complicates the proofs of Theorem 4 and Lemma 8. So we assume a primefinite field until Remark 14.
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Next we give sufficient conditions in terms of the coset distance [14] or the first relative generalized
Hamming weight [27]. To do so, we have to slightly modify them. For (𝐚|𝐛) = (𝑎1, . . . , 𝑎𝑛|𝑏1, . . . ,
𝑏𝑛) ∈ 𝐅𝑛𝑝, define its symplectic weight swt(𝐚|𝐛) = |{𝑖 ∶ (𝑎𝑖, 𝑏𝑖) ≠ (0, 0)}|. For 𝑉2 ⊂ 𝑉1 ⊂ 𝐅2𝑛𝑝 , we definetheir coset distance as 𝑑𝑠(𝑉1, 𝑉2) = min{swt(𝐚|𝐛) ∶ (𝐚|𝐛) ∈ 𝑉1 ⧵ 𝑉2}.
Theorem 6 If |𝐴| ≤ 𝑑𝑠(𝐶R, 𝐶S)−1 then𝐴 is forbidden. If |𝐴| ≥ 𝑛−𝑑𝑠(𝐶⟂𝑠S , 𝐶⟂𝑠R )+1 then𝐴 is qualified.
Example 7 Notations remain the same as Example 3. We have 𝑑𝑠(𝐶R, 𝐶S) = 3 and 𝑑𝑠(𝐶⟂𝑠S , 𝐶⟂𝑠R ) = 1. ByTheorem 6, we know that two or less participants are forbidden and all the participants are qualified.
Proof (Theorem 6) If |𝐴| ≤ 𝑑𝑠(𝐶R, 𝐶S)−1 then there is no (𝐚|𝐛) ∈ 𝐶R ∩𝐅𝐴𝑝 ⧵𝐶S ∩𝐅𝐴𝑝 and Eq. (2) holds.
Assume that |𝐴| ≥ 𝑛−𝑑𝑠(𝐶⟂𝑠S , 𝐶⟂𝑠R )+1, or equivalently, |𝐴| ≤ 𝑑𝑠(𝐶⟂𝑠S , 𝐶⟂𝑠R )−1. We have𝐶⟂𝑠S ∩𝐅𝐴𝑝 =
𝐶⟂𝑠R ∩𝐅
𝐴
𝑝 . We also have 𝐅𝐴𝑝 = ker(𝑃𝐴), which means dim𝑃𝐴(𝐶⟂𝑠S )−dim𝑃𝐴(𝐶⟂𝑠R ) = dim𝐶⟂𝑠S −dim𝐶⟂𝑠R =
𝑘. Since dim𝐶R ∩ 𝐅𝐴𝑝 − dim𝐶S ∩ 𝐅𝐴𝑝 = dim𝑃𝐴(𝐶⟂𝑠S ) − dim𝑃𝐴(𝐶⟂𝑠R ) = 𝑘, we see that Eq. (1) holds with
𝐴. ⊓⊔
4 Amount of information possessed by an intermediate set
Let 𝐴 ⊂ {1, . . . , 𝑛} with 𝐴 ≠ ∅ and 𝐴 ≠ {1, . . . , 𝑛}. In this section we study the amount of information
possessed by 𝐴.
Because the result 𝑓 (𝐦) of mapping 𝑓 is an element in 𝐶⟂𝑠S ∕𝐶⟂𝑠R , any two vectors (𝐚1|𝐛1) and
(𝐚2|𝐛2) ∈ 𝑓 (𝐦) give the same symplectic inner product values with any (𝐚3|𝐛3) ∈ 𝐶R.
Lemma 8 For two classical secrets 𝐦1 and 𝐦2, we have
– Tr𝐴(𝜌(𝐦𝟏)) = Tr𝐴(𝜌(𝐦𝟐)) if and only if 𝑓 (𝐦1) and 𝑓 (𝐦2) give the same symplectic inner product
for all vectors in 𝐶R ∩ 𝐅𝐴𝑝 , and
– col(Tr𝐴(𝜌(𝐦𝟏))) and col(Tr𝐴(𝜌(𝐦𝟐))) are orthogonal to each other if and only if 𝑓 (𝐦1) and 𝑓 (𝐦2)
give different symplectic inner products for some vector (𝐚|𝐛) in 𝐶R ∩ 𝐅𝐴𝑝 .
Proof Assume that 𝑓 (𝐦1) and 𝑓 (𝐦2) give the same symplectic inner product for all vectors in 𝐶R ∩
𝐅𝐴𝑝 . Then we have {𝑃𝐴(𝐚|𝐛) + 𝑃𝐴(𝐶⟂𝑠R ) ∶ (𝐚|𝐛) + 𝐶⟂𝑠R ∈ 𝑓 (𝐦1)} = {𝑃𝐴(𝐚|𝐛) + 𝑃𝐴(𝐶⟂𝑠R ) ∶ (𝐚|𝐛) +
𝐶⟂𝑠R ∈ 𝑓 (𝐦2)}, and the encoding procedure on 𝐴 is the same for𝐦1 and𝐦2, which shows Tr𝐴(𝜌(𝐦1)) =
Tr𝐴(𝜌(𝐦2)).Assume that 𝑓 (𝐦1) and 𝑓 (𝐦2) give different symplectic inner product values for some vector (𝐚|𝐛)in 𝐶R ∩ 𝐅𝐴𝑝 . Then the quantum measurement corresponding to 𝑋(𝐚)𝑍(𝐛) can be performed only bythe participants in 𝐴 and by [23, Lemma 5] the outcomes for 𝜌(𝐦1) and 𝜌(𝑓 (𝐦2)) are different withprobability 1. This means that col(Tr𝐴(𝜌(𝐦𝟏))) and col(Tr𝐴(𝜌(𝐦𝟐))) are orthogonal to each other. ⊓⊔
Proposition 9 If dim𝐶R ∩ 𝐅𝐴𝑝 ∕𝐶S ∩ 𝐅𝐴𝑝 = 𝓁, then the number of density matrices in 𝛬 = {Tr𝐴(𝜌(𝐦)) ∶
𝐦 ∈ 𝐅𝑘𝑝} is 𝑝
𝓁 .
For a fixed density matrix 𝜌 ∈ 𝛬, the number of classical secrets 𝐦 such that 𝜌 = Tr𝐴(𝜌(𝐦)) is
exactly 𝑝𝑘−𝓁 .
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Proof If𝑃𝐴(𝐮1|𝐯1)+𝑃𝐴(𝐶⟂𝑠R ) ≠ 𝑃𝐴(𝐮2|𝐯2)+𝑃𝐴(𝐶⟂𝑠R ) for (𝐮𝑖|𝐯𝑖) ∈ 𝑓 (𝐦𝑖)with classical secrets𝐦𝑖 (𝑖 = 1,
2), then by Lemma 8 col(Tr𝐴(𝜌(𝐦1))) and col(Tr𝐴(𝜌(𝐦2))) are orthogonal. By the assumption, we have
dim𝐶R∩𝐅𝐴𝑝 ∕𝐶S∩𝐅
𝐴
𝑝 = dim𝑃𝐴(𝐶
⟂𝑠
S )∕𝑃𝐴(𝐶
⟂𝑠
R ) = 𝓁. There are 𝑝𝓁 elements in 𝑃𝐴(𝐶⟂𝑠)∕𝑃𝐴(𝐶max), whichshows the first claim.
The composite 𝐅𝑝-linear map “mod𝑃𝐴(𝐶⟂𝑠R )” ◦𝑃𝐴◦𝑓 from 𝐅𝑘𝑝 to 𝑃𝐴(𝐶⟂𝑠S )∕𝑃𝐴(𝐶⟂𝑠R ) is surjective.Thus the dimension of its kernel is 𝑘 − 𝓁, which shows the second claim. ⊓⊔
Definition 10 In light of Proposition 9, the amount of information possessed by a set 𝐴 of participants
is defined as
(log2 𝑝) × dim𝐶R ∩ 𝐅𝐴𝑝 ∕𝐶S ∩ 𝐅
𝐴
𝑝 = (log2 𝑝) × dim𝑃𝐴(𝐶
⟂𝑠
S )∕𝑃𝐴(𝐶
⟂𝑠
R ). (3)
Remark 11 When the probability distribution of classical secrets𝐦 is uniform, the quantity in Definition
10 is equal to the Holevo information [38, Section 12.1.1] between𝐦 and Tr𝐴(𝜌(𝐦)) by the same reasonas [32, Remark 14].
We say that a secret sharing scheme is 𝑟𝑖-reconstructible if |𝐴| ≥ 𝑟𝑖 implies 𝐴 has 𝑖 log2 𝑝 or morebits of information [15]. We say that a secret sharing scheme is 𝑡𝑖-private if |𝐴| ≤ 𝑡𝑖 implies 𝐴 has lessthan 𝑖 log2 𝑝 bits of information [15]. In order to express 𝑟𝑖 and 𝑡𝑖 in terms of combinatorial properties of
𝐶 , we review a slightly modified version of the relative generalized Hamming weight [27].
Definition 12 [32] For two linear spaces 𝑉2 ⊂ 𝑉1 ⊂ 𝐅2𝑛𝑝 and 𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑘, define the 𝑖-th relativegeneralized symplectic weight
𝑑𝑖𝑠(𝑉1, 𝑉2) = min{|𝐴| ∶ dim𝐅𝐴𝑝 ∩ 𝑉1 − dim𝐅𝐴𝑝 ∩ 𝑉2 ≥ 𝑖}. (4)
Note that 𝑑1𝑠 = 𝑑𝑠. The following theorem generalizes Theorem 6.
Theorem 13
𝑡𝑖 ≥ 𝑑𝑖𝑠(𝐶R, 𝐶S) − 1,
𝑟𝑘+1−𝑖 ≤ 𝑛 − 𝑑𝑖𝑠(𝐶⟂𝑠S , 𝐶⟂𝑠R ) + 1.
Proof Almost the same as [32, Theorem 16]. ⊓⊔
Remark 14 We have assumed the prime finite field 𝐅𝑝. We can translate Theorems 4, 6, 13, Proposition9 and Definition 10 to an arbitrary finite field 𝐅𝑞 in the same way as [32, Section 5.1].
5 Gilbert-Varshamov-type existential condition
Let 𝑞 be some prime power. In this section, we give a sufficient condition for existence of 𝐶S ⊂ 𝐶R ⊆
𝐶⟂𝑠R ⊂ 𝐶
⟂𝑠
S ⊂ 𝐅
2𝑛
𝑞 , with given parameters.
Theorem 15 If positive integers 𝑛, 𝑘, 𝑠, 𝛿𝑡, 𝛿𝑟 satisfy
𝑞𝑛+𝑘+𝑠 − 𝑞𝑛+𝑠
𝑞2𝑛 − 1
𝛿𝑟−1∑
𝑖=1
(
𝑛
𝑖
)
(𝑞2 − 1)𝑖 + 𝑞
𝑛−𝑠 − 𝑞𝑛−𝑘−𝑠
𝑞2𝑛 − 1
𝛿𝑡−1∑
𝑖=1
(
𝑛
𝑖
)
(𝑞2 − 1)𝑖 < 1, (5)
then there exist 𝐶S ⊂ 𝐶R ⊆ 𝐶⟂𝑠R ⊂ 𝐶
⟂𝑠
S ⊂ 𝐅
2𝑛
𝑞 such that dim𝐶S = 𝑛 − 𝑘 − 𝑠, dim𝐶R = 𝑛 − 𝑠
𝑑𝑠(𝐶⟂𝑠S , 𝐶
⟂𝑠
R ) ≥ 𝛿𝑟 and 𝑑𝑠(𝐶R, 𝐶S) ≥ 𝛿𝑡.
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Proof The following argument is similar to the proof of Gilbert-Varshamov bound for stabilizer codes [8]
and also to [32]. Let Sp(𝑞, 𝑛) be the set of invertible matrices on 𝐅2𝑛𝑞 that does not change the values of thesymplectic inner product. Let𝐴(𝑘) be the set of pairs of linear spaces (𝑉 ,𝑊 ) such that dim𝑉 = 𝑛−𝑘−𝑠,
dim𝑊 = 𝑛 − 𝑠 and 𝑉 ⊂ 𝑊 ⊆ 𝑊 ⟂𝑠 ⊂ 𝑉 ⟂𝑠 ⊂ 𝐅2𝑛𝑞 . For 𝐞 ∈ 𝐅2𝑛𝑞 , define 𝐵𝑉 (𝑘, 𝐞) = {(𝑉 ,𝑊 ) ∈ 𝐴(𝑘) ∶
𝐞 ∈ 𝑉 ⟂𝑠 ⧵𝑊 ⟂𝑠} and 𝐵𝑊 (𝑘, 𝐞) = {(𝑉 ,𝑊 ) ∈ 𝐴(𝑘) ∶ 𝐞 ∈ 𝑊 ⧵ 𝑉 }.For nonzero 𝐞1 , 𝐞2 ∈ 𝐅2𝑛𝑞 , we have |𝐵𝑊 (𝑘, 𝐞1)| = |𝐵𝑊 (𝑘, 𝐞2)| and |𝐵𝑉 (𝑘, 𝐞1)| = |𝐵𝑉 (𝑘, 𝐞2)|, by thealmost same argument as [32, Proof of Theorem 25].
For each (𝑉 ,𝑊 ) ∈ 𝐴(𝑘), the number of 𝐞 such that 𝐞 ∈ 𝑊 ⧵ 𝑉 is |𝑊 | − |𝑉 | = 𝑞𝑛−𝑠 − 𝑞𝑛−𝑘−𝑠. The
number of triples (𝐞, 𝑉 ,𝑊 ) such that 𝟎 ≠ 𝐞 ∈ 𝑊 ⧵ 𝑉 is∑
𝟎≠𝐞∈𝐅2𝑛𝑞
|𝐵𝑊 (𝑘, 𝐞)| = |𝐴(𝑘)| × (𝑞𝑛 − 𝑞𝑘),
which implies |𝐵𝑊 (𝑘, 𝐞)||𝐴(𝑘)| = 𝑞𝑛−𝑠 − 𝑞𝑛−𝑘−𝑠𝑞2𝑛 − 1 . (6)
Similarly we have |𝐵𝑉 (𝑘, 𝐞)||𝐴(𝑘)| = 𝑞𝑛+𝑘+𝑠 − 𝑞𝑛+𝑠𝑞2𝑛 − 1 . (7)
If there exists (𝑉 ,𝑊 ) ∈ 𝐴(𝑘) such that (𝑉 ,𝑊 ) ∉ 𝐵𝑉 (𝑘, 𝐞1) and (𝑉 ,𝑊 ) ∉ 𝐵𝑉 (𝑘, 𝐞2) for all 1 ≤
swt(𝐞1) ≤ 𝛿𝑟 − 1 and 1 ≤ swt(𝐞2) ≤ 𝛿𝑡 − 1 then there exists a pair of (𝑉 ,𝑊 ) with the desired properties.The number of 𝐞 such that 1 ≤ swt(𝐞) ≤ 𝛿 − 1 is given by
𝛿−1∑
𝑖=1
(
𝑛
𝑖
)
(𝑞2 − 1)𝑖. (8)
By combining Eqs. (6), (7) and (8) we see that Eq. (5) is a sufficient condition for ensuring the existence
of (𝑉 ,𝑊 ) required in Theorem 15. ⊓⊔
We will derive an asymptotic form of Theorem 15.
Theorem 16 Let 𝑅, 𝑆, 𝜖𝑡 and 𝜖𝑟 be nonnegative real numbers ≤ 1. Define ℎ𝑞(𝑥) = −𝑥 log𝑞 𝑥 − (1 −
𝑥) log𝑞(1 − 𝑥). For sufficiently large 𝑛, if
ℎ𝑞(𝜖𝑡) + 𝜖𝑡 log𝑞(𝑞2 − 1) < 1 + 𝑆 and
ℎ𝑞(𝜖𝑟) + 𝜖𝑟 log𝑞(𝑞2 − 1) < 1 − 𝑅 − 𝑆,
then there exist 𝐶S ⊂ 𝐶R ⊆ 𝐶⟂𝑠R ⊂ 𝐶
⟂𝑠
S ⊂ 𝐅
2𝑛
𝑞 such that dim𝐶S = 𝑛 − ⌊𝑛(𝑅 + 𝑆)⌋, dim𝐶R = 𝑛 − ⌊𝑛𝑆⌋
𝑑𝑠(𝐶⟂𝑠S , 𝐶
⟂𝑠
R ) ≥ ⌊𝑛𝜖𝑟⌋ and 𝑑𝑠(𝐶R, 𝐶S) ≥ ⌊𝑛𝜖𝑡⌋.
Proof Proof can be done by almost the same argument as [36, Section III.C]. ⊓⊔
In [32, Theorem 26] we proved a special case 𝑆 = 0 of Theorem 16. The new parameter 𝑆 ≥ 0 provides
larger flexibility.
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6 Strong Security
Let 𝑛 = 𝑞, and let 𝑘, 𝑛 − 𝑠 − 𝑘 be nonnegative even integers.. The field size 𝑞 can be either odd or even.
We will consider the case that the number of participants is smaller than 𝑞 in Remark 21. Let 𝛼1, . . . ,
𝛼𝑛 ∈ 𝐅𝑞 be 𝑛 distinct elements. Define an [𝑛, 𝑘] Reed-Solomon (RS) code as
RS(𝑛, 𝑘) = {(𝑔(𝛼1),… , 𝑔(𝛼𝑛)) ∶ 𝑔(𝑥) ∈ 𝐅𝑞[𝑥], deg 𝑔(𝑥) < 𝑘}.
Then RS(𝑛, 𝑘)⟂𝐸 = RS(𝑛, 𝑛 − 𝑘) because 𝑛 = 𝑞.
6.1 Insecure example
In order to justify our study of strong security, we will show an insecure ramp scheme constructed in the
framework of [31,32]. Assume that 𝑛 = 𝑞 are even integers only in Section 6.1. Let 𝐶S = {𝟎}, 𝑠 = 0,
𝑘 = 𝑛, and 𝐶R = 𝐶max = 𝐶⟂𝑠R = RS(𝑛, 𝑛∕2) × RS(𝑛, 𝑛∕2). For classical secret 𝐦 = (𝑚1, . . . , 𝑚𝑛),let ℎ1(𝑥) = 𝑚1𝑥𝑛∕2 +⋯ + 𝑚𝑛∕2𝑥𝑛−1 and ℎ2(𝑥) = 𝑚1+𝑛∕2𝑥𝑛∕2 +⋯ + 𝑚𝑛𝑥𝑛−1. Define an 𝐅𝑞-linear map
𝑓 ∶ 𝐅𝑛𝑞 → 𝐶
⟂𝑠
S ∕𝐶
⟂𝑠
R in Section 2.2 as
𝑓 (𝐦) = (ℎ1(𝛼1),… , ℎ1(𝛼𝑛)|ℎ2(𝛼1),… , ℎ2(𝛼𝑛)) + 𝐶⟂𝑠R .
As shown in [31,32, Section 5.4], any 𝑛−1 shares have (𝑛−2) log2 𝑞 bits of information about𝐦. Assume
𝛼𝑛 = 0. The participant set 𝐴 = {1, . . . , 𝑛 − 1} can perform measurement corresponding to a nonzerovector in 𝐶R ∩ 𝐅𝐴𝑞 , which contains (𝐮𝑖|𝟎) and (𝟎|𝐮𝑖) for 𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑛∕2 − 1, where 𝐮 = (𝛼𝑖1, . . . , 𝛼𝑖𝑛−1,
𝛼𝑖𝑛 = 0). We have
⟨(𝐮𝑖|𝟎), (ℎ1(𝛼1),… , ℎ1(𝛼𝑛)|ℎ2(𝛼1),… , ℎ2(𝛼𝑛))⟩𝑠 = 𝑚𝑛−𝑖,⟨(𝟎|𝐮𝑖), (ℎ1(𝛼1),… , ℎ1(𝛼𝑛)|ℎ2(𝛼1),… , ℎ2(𝛼𝑛))⟩𝑠 = −𝑚𝑛∕2−𝑖−1.
By [23, Lemma 5], the share set 𝐴 = {1, . . . , 𝑛 − 1} can completely determine 𝑛 − 2 symbols 𝑚1, . . . ,
𝑚𝑛∕2−2, 𝑚𝑛∕2, . . . , 𝑚𝑛∕2−1 in the classical secret 𝐦. In the next subsection, we will show a remedy toaddress this kind of insecurity.
6.2 Definition and construction of strongly secure schemes
Definition 17 Let 𝐴 ⊂ {1, . . . , 𝑛} be a share set and 𝜌𝐴 the density matrix of shares in 𝐴. Let 𝐦 ∈ 𝐅𝑘𝑞
be a classical secret drawn from the uniform probability distribution on 𝐅𝑘𝑞 . Let 𝑍 ⊂ {1, . . . , 𝑘∕2}.A quantum ramp secret sharing scheme is said to be strongly secure if 𝐼(𝐦; 𝜌𝐴) = 𝓁 log2 𝑞 > 0 then
𝐼(𝑃𝑍∪𝑘∕2+𝑍 (𝐦); 𝜌𝐴) = 0 for all 𝑍 with 2|𝑍| ≤ 𝑘 − 𝓁, where 𝐼(⋅; ⋅) denotes the Holevo information [38,Section 12.1.1] counted in log2, 𝑘∕2 + 𝑍 = {𝑘∕2 + 𝑧 ∶ 𝑧 ∈ 𝑍} and 𝑃𝑍∪𝑘∕2+𝑍 is previously definedprojection to an index set 𝑍 ∪ 𝑘∕2 +𝑍 ⊂ {1, . . . , 𝑘}.
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The above definition is a straightforward generalization of [21, Definition 6] to the quantum setting, with
regarding (𝑚𝑖, 𝑚𝑖+𝑘∕2) ∈ 𝐅2𝑞 as one symbol and the secret 𝐦 consisting of 𝑘∕2 such symbols.In this subsection, we will construct a scheme distributing a classical secret consisting of 𝑘 symbols
in 𝐅𝑞 to 𝑛 participants with 1 qudit of dimension 𝑞, so that any (𝑛+ 𝑘+ 𝑠)∕2 participants can reconstructthe secret, while any (𝑛 + 𝑠)∕2 or less participants have no information about the secret, with the above
strong security. We note that a somewhat similar idea was used for construction of a strongly secure ramp
secret sharing scheme with classical shares [33].
We assume that 𝛼1, . . . , 𝛼𝑘∕2 are nonzero. Define
𝐶S = {(𝐚|𝐛) ∶ 𝐚,𝐛 ∈ RS(𝑛, (𝑛 − 𝑘 − 𝑠)∕2)},
𝐶R = {(𝐚|𝐛) ∶ 𝐚,𝐛 ∈ RS(𝑛, (𝑛 − 𝑠)∕2)}.
Then we can easily see that
𝐶⟂𝑠R = {(𝐚|𝐛) ∶ 𝐚,𝐛 ∈ RS(𝑛, (𝑛 + 𝑠)∕2)},
𝐶⟂𝑠S = {(𝐚|𝐛) ∶ 𝐚,𝐛 ∈ RS(𝑛, (𝑛 + 𝑘 + 𝑠)∕2)},
dim𝐶S = 𝑛 − 𝑘 − 𝑠,
dim𝐶R = 𝑛 − 𝑠.
We can choose 𝐶max as, for example,
𝐶max = {(𝐚|𝐛) ∶ 𝐚 ∈ RS(𝑛, ⌊𝑛∕2⌋),𝐛 ∈ RS(𝑛, ⌈𝑛∕2⌉)}.
For a classical secret 𝐦 = (𝑚1, . . . , 𝑚𝑘) ∈ 𝐅𝑘𝑞 , find 𝑔1(𝑥) = 𝑎0𝑥0 + ⋯ + 𝑎𝑘∕2−1𝑥𝑘∕2−1 and 𝑔2(𝑥) =
𝑏0𝑥0 +⋯ + 𝑏𝑘∕2−1𝑥𝑘∕2−1 such that 𝑔1(𝛼𝑗) = 𝑚𝑗∕𝛼(𝑛+𝑠)∕2𝑗 and 𝑔2(𝛼𝑗) = 𝑚𝑗+𝑘∕2∕𝛼(𝑛+𝑠)∕2𝑗 for all 𝑗 = 1, . . . ,
𝑘∕2. Such 𝑔1(𝑥) and 𝑔2(𝑥) always exist because computation of 𝑔𝑖(𝑥) is just the inverse mapping of the
encoding of RS(𝑘∕2, 𝑘∕2) for the codeword (𝑚1∕𝛼(𝑛+𝑠)∕21 , . . . , 𝑚𝑘∕2∕𝛼(𝑛+𝑠)∕2𝑘∕2 ). Let 𝑔3(𝑥) = 𝑥(𝑛+𝑠)∕2𝑔1(𝑥)
and 𝑔4(𝑥) = 𝑥(𝑛+𝑠)∕2𝑔2(𝑥). Observe that 𝑔3(𝛼𝑗) = 𝑚𝑗 and 𝑔4(𝛼𝑗) = 𝑚𝑘∕2+𝑗 . Define a bijective 𝐅𝑞-linearmap 𝑓 as
𝑓 (𝐦) = (𝑔3(𝛼1),… , 𝑔3(𝛼𝑛)|𝑔4(𝛼1),… , 𝑔4(𝛼𝑛)) + 𝐶⟂𝑠R ∈ 𝐶⟂𝑠S ∕𝐶⟂𝑠R .
The quantum shares are computed as in Section 2.2 with the above 𝑓 . For 𝐴 ⊂ {1, . . . , 𝑛}, let 𝜌𝐴 be thedensity matrix of quantum shares in 𝐴. By almost the same argument as [32, Section 5.4], we see that
the Holevo information 𝐼(𝐦; 𝜌𝐴) between 𝐦 and 𝜌𝐴 is
𝐼(𝐦; 𝜌𝐴) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
0 if 0 ≤ |𝐴| ≤ 𝑛+𝑠
2
,
2
(|𝐴| − 𝑛+𝑠
2
)
log2 𝑞 if 𝑛+𝑠2 ≤ |𝐴| ≤ 𝑛+𝑘+𝑠2 ,
𝑘 log2 𝑞 if 𝑛+𝑘+𝑠2 ≤ |𝐴| ≤ 𝑛.
(9)
In particular, the above means that 𝐴 is qualified if and only if |𝐴| ≥ (𝑛+ 𝑘+ 𝑠)∕2 and 𝐴 is forbidden if
and only if |𝐴| ≤ (𝑛 + 𝑠)∕2.
Let 𝐵 ⊂ {1, . . . , 𝑘}. By slight abuse of notation, by 𝑃𝐵(𝐦) we mean (𝑚𝑖)𝑖∈𝐵 . In order to verifythe strong security, we have to compute the Holevo information 𝐼(𝑃𝐵(𝐦); 𝜌𝐴). In order to compute
𝐼(𝑃𝐵(𝐦); 𝜌𝐴), we consider the following related problem. Let 𝐵 = {1, . . . , 𝑘} ⧵ 𝐵. When we considerthe strong security of 𝑃𝐵(𝐦), the rest 𝑃𝐵(𝐦) serves as dummy variable to hide 𝑃𝐵(𝐦).
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Let 𝐵′ ⊂ {1, . . . , 𝑘∕2} and 𝐵′ = {1, . . . , 𝑘∕2} ⧵ 𝐵′. For 𝑔(𝑥) = 𝑎0𝑥0 +
⋯ 𝑎(𝑛+𝑘+𝑠)∕2−1−|𝐵′|𝑥(𝑛+𝑘+𝑠)∕2−1−|𝐵′|, define 𝑔𝐵′ (𝑥) = 𝑎(𝑛+𝑘+𝑠)∕2−|𝐵′|𝑥(𝑛+𝑘+𝑠)∕2−|𝐵′| + ⋯ +
𝑎(𝑛+𝑘+𝑠)∕2−1𝑥(𝑛+𝑘+𝑠)∕2−1 such that 𝑔𝐵′ (𝛼𝑗) = −∑(𝑛+𝑘+𝑠)∕2−1−|𝐵′|𝑖=(𝑛+𝑠)∕2 𝑎𝑖𝛼𝑖𝑗 for 𝑗 ∈ 𝐵′. Such a 𝑔𝐵′ (𝑥) is
uniquely determined because it is the inverse of encoding of [|𝐵′|, |𝐵′|] generalized Reed-Solomon
code. Define a linear code
𝐷𝐵′ = {(𝑔(𝛼1) + 𝑔𝐵′ (𝛼1),… , 𝑔(𝛼𝑛) + 𝑔𝐵′ (𝛼𝑛)) ∶ deg 𝑔(𝑥) ≤ (𝑛 + 𝑘 + 𝑠)∕2 − 1 − |𝐵′|}.
For a subset 𝑆 ⊂ 𝐅𝑛𝑞 , by abuse of notation we mean 𝑃𝐴(𝑆) = {(𝑥𝑖)𝑖∈𝐴 ∶ (𝑥1, . . . , 𝑥𝑛) ∈ 𝑆}.
Lemma 18 Assume |𝐵′| < 𝑘∕2.
dim𝑃𝐴(RS(𝑛, (𝑛 + 𝑘 + 𝑠)∕2)) − dim𝑃𝐴(𝐷𝐵′ )
=
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
0 if 0 ≤ |𝐴| ≤ 𝑛+𝑘+𝑠
2
− |𝐵′|,(|𝐴| + |𝐵′| − 𝑛+𝑘+𝑠
2
)
if 𝑛+𝑘+𝑠
2
− |𝐵′| ≤ |𝐴| ≤ 𝑛+𝑘+𝑠
2
,|𝐵′| if 𝑛+𝑘+𝑠
2
≤ |𝐴| ≤ 𝑛. (10)
Proof Since the minimum Hamming distance of RS(𝑛, (𝑛+ 𝑘+ 𝑠)∕2) is (𝑛− 𝑘− 𝑠)∕2 + 1, we have [40]
dim𝑃𝐴(RS(𝑛, (𝑛 + 𝑘 + 𝑠)∕2)) =
{ |𝐴| if 0 ≤ |𝐴| ≤ 𝑛+𝑘+𝑠
2
,
𝑛+𝑘+𝑠
2
if 𝑛+𝑘+𝑠
2
≤ |𝐴| ≤ 𝑛. (11)
The codeword in 𝐷𝐵′ is the sum of a codeword in RS(𝑛, (𝑛+ 𝑘+ 𝑠)∕2 − |𝐵′|) and the codeword definedby 𝑔𝐵′ (𝑥). The latter can be seen as a codeword in a generalized Reed-Solomon code of length 𝑛 anddimension |𝐵′|. So, the Hamming weight of a codeword defined by 𝑔𝐵′ (𝑥) is ≥ 𝑛+1− |𝐵′|. There existsa codeword in RS(𝑛, (𝑛+𝑘+𝑠)∕2− |𝐵′|) of Hamming weight (𝑛−𝑘−𝑠)∕2+1+ |𝐵′|. Since |𝐵′| < 𝑘∕2,
the condition 𝑘−𝑠 ≤ 𝑛 implies 𝑛+1− |𝐵′| > (𝑛−𝑘−𝑠)∕2+1+ |𝐵′|. Under this condition, the minimum
weight codeword in RS(𝑛, (𝑛 + 𝑘 + 𝑠)∕2 − |𝐵′|) cannot be canceled by a codeword defined by 𝑔𝐵′ (𝑥).Therefore, the minimum Hamming distance of 𝐷𝐵′ is (𝑛 − 𝑘 − 𝑠)∕2 + 1 + |𝐵′|, which implies [40]
dim𝑃𝐴(𝐷𝐵′ ) =
{ |𝐴| if 0 ≤ |𝐴| ≤ (𝑛 + 𝑘 + 𝑠)∕2 − |𝐵′|,
(𝑛 + 𝑘 + 𝑠)∕2 − |𝐵′| if (𝑛 + 𝑘 + 𝑠)∕2 − |𝐵′| ≤ |𝐴| ≤ 𝑛. (12)
Combining Eqs. (11) and (12) gives the claim of this lemma. ⊓⊔
In light of Eq. (10), define 𝓁(𝑎, 𝑏) as
𝓁(𝑎, 𝑏) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
0 if 0 ≤ 𝑎 ≤ 𝑛+𝑘+𝑠
2
− 𝑏,(
𝑎 + 𝑏 − 𝑛+𝑘+𝑠
2
)
if 𝑛+𝑘+𝑠
2
− 𝑏 ≤ 𝑎 ≤ 𝑛+𝑘+𝑠
2
,
𝑏 if 𝑛+𝑘+𝑠
2
≤ 𝑎 ≤ 𝑛.
Proposition 19 Let 𝐵1 = 𝐵 ∩ {1,… , 𝑘∕2} and 𝐵2 = 𝐵 ∩ {1 + 𝑘∕2,… , 𝑘}
𝐼(𝑃𝐵(𝐦); 𝜌𝐴) = [𝓁(|𝐴|, |𝐵1|) + 𝓁(|𝐴|, |𝐵2|)] log2 𝑞
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Proof Let 𝐵 = {1, . . . , 𝑘} ⧵ 𝐵. When we see 𝑃𝐵(𝐦) as secret and 𝑃𝐵(𝐦) as meaningless dummy ran-domness, the corresponding secret sharing scheme is described by 𝐶⟂𝑠S ⊃ 𝐶 ′⟂𝑠R ⊃ 𝐶 ′R ⊃ 𝐶S, where 𝐶 ′⟂𝑠Rcorresponds to 𝐶⟂𝑠R in Section 2.2, and
𝐶 ′⟂𝑠R = {(𝐚|𝐛) ∶ 𝐚 ∈ 𝐷𝐵1 ,𝐛 ∈ 𝐷𝐵2}
In order to evaluate 𝐼(𝑃𝐵(𝐦); 𝜌𝐴), we have to compute dim𝐶 ′R ∩ 𝐅𝐴𝑞 ∕𝐶S ∩ 𝐅𝐴𝑞 , which is equal to
dim𝑃𝐴(𝐶⟂𝑠S ) − dim𝑃𝐴(𝐶
′⟂𝑠
R ). By Lemma 18 we have
dim𝑃𝐴(𝐶⟂𝑠S ) − dim𝑃𝐴(𝐶
′⟂𝑠
R ) = 𝓁(|𝐴|, |𝐵1|) + 𝓁(|𝐴|, |𝐵2|),
which completes the proof. ⊓⊔
Corollary 20 The proposed encoding scheme is strongly secure in the sense of Definition 17.
Proof Assume 𝐼(𝐦; 𝜌𝐴) = 𝓁 log2 𝑞 > 0. Then, by Eq. (9) |𝐴| = 𝓁+𝑛+𝑠2 , or equivalently, 𝓁 = 2|𝐴|−𝑛−𝑠.
Assume 2|𝑍| ≤ 𝑘 − 𝓁. Then |𝐴| ≤ 𝑛+𝑘+𝑠
2
− |𝑍|. For Proposition 19, we have |𝐵1| = |𝐵2| = |𝑍|. ByProposition 19, we have 𝐼(𝑃𝑍∪𝑘∕2+𝑍 (𝐦); 𝜌𝐴) = 0. ⊓⊔
Remark 21 Although we have assumed 𝑛 = 𝑞, we note that the number 𝑛′ of participants can be made
smaller than 𝑞 by discarding shares, which corresponds to
𝐶S = 𝐅𝐴𝑞 ∩ {(𝐚|𝐛) ∶ 𝐚,𝐛 ∈ RS(𝑛, (𝑛 − 𝑘 − 𝑠)∕2)},
𝐶R = 𝐅𝐴𝑞 ∩ {(𝐚|𝐛) ∶ 𝐚,𝐛 ∈ RS(𝑛, (𝑛 − 𝑠)∕2)},
𝐶⟂𝑠R = 𝑃𝐴({(𝐚|𝐛) ∶ 𝐚,𝐛 ∈ RS(𝑛, (𝑛 + 𝑠)∕2)}),
𝐶⟂𝑠S = 𝑃𝐴({(𝐚|𝐛) ∶ 𝐚,𝐛 ∈ RS(𝑛, (𝑛 + 𝑘 + 𝑠)∕2)}),
where 𝐴 ⊂ {1, . . . , 𝑛} with |𝐴| = 𝑛′.
6.3 Comparison with the McEliece-Sarwate scheme
McEliece and Sarwate [37] proposed the first strongly secure ramp secret sharing scheme, whose strong
security was proved much later [39]. Let 𝛼1, . . . , 𝛼𝑛+𝑘 be distinct elements in 𝐅𝑞 . For a given secret (𝑚1,. . . , 𝑚𝑘) ∈ 𝐅𝑘𝑞 , randomly choose a polynomial 𝑔(𝑥) of degree less than (𝑛+ 𝑘+ 𝑠)∕2 such that 𝑔(𝛼𝑖) = 𝑚𝑖for 𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑘. Then it distributes 𝑔(𝛼𝑘+𝑖) to the 𝑖-th participant. Any (𝑛+ 𝑘+ 𝑠)∕2 or more participantscan reconstruct the secret. Any (𝑛 − 𝑘 + 𝑠)∕2 or less participants have no information about the secret.
Thus the qualified sets are the same, but the McEliece-Sarwate scheme has smaller forbidden sets than
the proposed one in Section 6.2. Equivalently, the classical secret in the proposed construction can be
twice as large as the McEliece-Sarwate scheme for the same qualified sets and the same forbidden sets.
In addition, the McEliece-Sarwate scheme can support at most 𝑞−𝑘 participants, while the proposed one
in Section 6.2 can support at most 𝑞 participants.
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